Leírás
This talk presents the results of [1]. A genotype is called an evolutionarily stable genotype (ESG) if the rare mutant cannot invade into the monomorphic resident population. We investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for an ESG in a general population genetics model. Then we apply our general ESG conditions for self-sacrificing life history strategy when the number of new-born offspring does not depend on interactions within the family and the interactions are additive. We consider three types of interactions: parental investment, sib altruism, and offspring gratitude. Both the dominant and the recessive case is studied.
[1] Garay, J., Garay, B.M., Varga, Z. et al. To save or not to save your family member’s life? Evolutionary stability of self-sacrificing life history strategy in monogamous sexual populations. BMC Evol Biol 19, 147 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12862-019-1478-0