


Toward Automated Diagrammatic Reasoning in Axiomatic Physics

Atriya Sen, Selmer Bringsjord, Nick Marton, John Licato

Rensselaer Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning Laboratory



Hierarchy of Ethical Reasoning

$DBCC^*_{CL}$ + diagrammatic reasoning

$DBCC^*$ + diagrammatic reasoning

ADR^M + diagrammatic reasoning

\mathcal{U} (UIMA/Watson-inspired)

DIARC

Hard, Harder,
Hardest...

Hard: Proof Verification



Example

- Four Colour Theorem (1976,¹ 2005)
- Flyspeck Project (2014)
 - Verifies proof of the Kepler Conjecture
 - Uses HOL Light and Isabelle assistants

¹ Arkoudas, K. & Bringsjord, S. (2007) "Computers, Justification, and Mathematical Knowledge" *Minds and Machines* 17.2: 185-202.

Computers, Justification, and Mathematical Knowledge

Konstantine Arkoudas · Selmer Bringsjord

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Abstract The original proof of the four-color theorem by Appel and Haken sparked a controversy when Tymoczko used it to argue that the justification provided by unsurveyable proofs carried out by computers cannot be a priori. It also created a lingering impression to the effect that such proofs depend heavily for their soundness on large amounts of computation-intensive custom-built software. Contra Tymoczko, we argue that the justification provided by certain computerized mathematical proofs is not fundamentally different from that provided by surveyable proofs, and can be sensibly regarded as a priori. We also show that the aforementioned impression is mistaken because it fails to distinguish between proof search (the context of discovery) and proof checking (the context of justification). By using mechanized proof assistants capable of producing certificates that can be independently checked, it is possible to carry out complex proofs without the need to trust arbitrary custom-written code. We only need to trust one fixed, small, and simple piece of software: the proof checker. This is not only possible in principle, but is in fact becoming a viable methodology for performing complicated mathematical reasoning. This is evinced by a new proof of the four-color theorem that appeared in 2005, and which was developed and checked in its entirety by a mechanical proof system.

Keywords A priori · Justification · Proofs · Certificates · Four-color theorem · Mathematical knowledge

K. Arkoudas (✉) · S. Bringsjord
Cognitive Science Department, Computer Science Department, RPI, Troy, NY, USA 12180
e-mail: arkouk@rpi.edu

S. Bringsjord
e-mail: brings@rpi.edu

Harder: Proof Discovery

Theorem
Axioms



Machine



Proof

Examples (first proofs)

◉ Semi-automated

◉ Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem (2013, RAIRL)

◉ Fully automated

◉ Robbins Conjecture in Otter (1997)

1

Licato, John, et al. "Analogico-deductive generation of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem from the Liar paradox." Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, 2013.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Analogico-Deductive Generation of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem from the Liar Paradox*

John Licato, Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu,
Selmer Bringsjord, Michael Pomeranz, Logan Gittelson
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy NY USA
{licatj,govinn,selmer,pomerm,gittel}@rpi.edu

Abstract

Gödel's proof of his famous first incompleteness theorem (G1) has quite understandably long been a tantalizing target for those wanting to engineer impressively intelligent computational systems. After all, in establishing G1, Gödel did something that by any metric must be classified as stunningly intelligent. We observe that it has long been understood that there is some sort of analogical relationship between the Liar Paradox (LP) and G1, and that Gödel himself appreciated and exploited the relationship. Yet the exact nature of the relationship has hitherto not been uncovered, by which we mean that the following question has not been answered: Given a description of LP, and the suspicion that it may somehow be used by a suitably programmed computing machine to find a proof of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic, can such a machine, provided this description as input, produce as output a complete and verifiably correct proof of G1? In this paper, we summarize engineering that entails an affirmative answer to this question. Our approach uses what we call *analogico-deductive reasoning* (ADR), which combines analogical and deductive reasoning to produce a full deductive proof of G1 from LP. Our engineering uses a form of ADR based on our META-R system, and a connection between the Liar Sentence in LP and Gödel's Fixed Point Lemma, from which G1 follows quickly.

1 Introduction

Gödel's proofs of his incompleteness theorems are among the greatest intellectual achievements of the 20th century. Even armed with the suggestion that the Liar Paradox (LP) might somehow serve as a guide to proving the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic (PA),¹ the level of creativity and philosophy

*We are deeply grateful for penetrating feedback provided by three anonymous referees, and for financial support from AFOSR and the John Templeton Foundation.

¹G1 of course applies to any axiom system meeting the standard conditions (Turing-decidability, representability, consistency), but we tend to refer to PA for economization.

ical clarity required to actually tie the two concepts together and produce a valid proof is staggering; it certainly should not be controversial to claim that no computational reasoning system can, at present, achieve this sort of feat without significant human assistance.

1.1 Automating the Proof of G1

Prior work devoted to producing computational systems able to prove G1 have yielded systems that manage to prove this theorem only when the distance between this result and the starting point is quite small. This for example holds for the first (and certainly seminal) foray; i.e., for [?], as explained in [?], where it's shown that the proof of G1, because the set of premises includes an ingenious human-devised encoding scheme, is very easy—to the point of being at the level of proofs requested from students in introductory mathematical logic classes.

Likewise, [?] is an exact parallel of the human-devised proof given by [?]. Finally, in much more recent and truly impressive work by [?], there is a move to natural-deduction formats, which we applaud—but the machine essentially begins its processing at a point exceedingly close to where it needs to end up. As Sieg and Field concede: "As axioms we take for granted the representability and derivability conditions for the central syntactic notions as well as the diagonal lemma for constructing self-referential sentences." If one takes for granted such things, finding a proof of G1 is effortless for a computing machine.² In sum, while a lot of commendable work has been done to build the foundation for our prospective work, the daunting formal and engineering challenge of producing a computational system able to produce G1 without clever seeding from a human remains entirely unmet.

2 The Analogico-Deductive Approach

2.1 Conjecture Generation

The problem with the purely deductive method is simply that it does not allow us to come close to the type of model-based reasoning that great thinkers are known to have used. Gödel himself has been described as having a "line

²A video demonstration of the small-distance process can be found at <http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/GodelI.abstract.in.Slate.mov>.

Hardest: Theorem Discovery

Axioms → Machine → Theorems

```
graph LR; Axioms --> Machine; Machine --> Theorems
```


Examples

• :(

Axioms



Machine 1




Theorem

Axioms



Machine 2



Proof

Theorem

Axioms



Machine 3




Yes/No

Axioms




Machine 1



Theorem
Axioms



Machine 2



Proof
Theorem
Axioms



Machine 3



Yes/No

(Formal) Axiomatizations in the Natural Sciences

- Physics

- Einstein's Theory of Relativity, due to Andr eka et al.

- Biology

- Mendelian genetics of diploid eukaryotes, due to Woodger (1937)
- Semi-formally: biological and bio-medical ontologies

1.11-1.1.1 Axiom. $\forall x,y,z ((\text{part}(x,y) \wedge \text{part}(y,z)) \rightarrow \text{part}(x,z))$
{1.11-1.1.1 Axiom} Assume ✓

1.1.2 Axiom. $\forall y (\text{sum}(y,\alpha) \leftrightarrow (\forall w (\text{member}(w,\alpha) \rightarrow \text{part}(w,y)) \wedge \forall z (\text{part}(z,y) \rightarrow \exists c (\text{part}(c,z) \wedge \exists m (\text{member}(m,\alpha) \wedge \text{part}(c,m)))))) \wedge \forall x,w (\text{member}(w,\alpha) \leftrightarrow (w = x)))$
{1.1.2 Axiom} Assume ✓

1.12 Axiom. $\forall x,y ((\text{sum}(y,\alpha) \wedge (\text{member}(x,\alpha) \wedge \neg \exists x2 (\text{member}(x2,\alpha) \wedge x \neq x2))) \rightarrow (x = y))$
{1.12 Axiom} Assume ✓

1.13 Axiom. $\forall \alpha (\exists m \text{ member}(m,\alpha) \rightarrow \exists s \text{ sum}(s,\alpha))$
{1.13 Axiom} Assume ✓

1.21. $\forall x ((\text{member}(x,\alpha) \wedge \neg \exists x2 (\text{member}(x2,\alpha) \wedge x \neq x2)) \rightarrow (\text{sum}(x,\alpha) \wedge \neg \exists x2 (\text{sum}(x2,\alpha) \wedge x \neq x2)))$
{1.12 Axiom,1.13 Axiom}

FOL ⊢ ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

1.23-1.1.6. $\forall x,y ((\text{part}(x,y) \wedge \text{part}(y,x)) \rightarrow (x = y))$
{1.1.2 Axiom}

FOL ⊢ ✓

1.22-1.1.4. $\forall x \text{ part}(x,x)$
{1.1.2 Axiom,1.12 Axiom,1.13 Axiom}

FOL ⊢ ✓

1.1.5. $\forall x,y ((\text{part}(x,y) \wedge x \neq y) \rightarrow \neg \text{part}(y,x))$
{1.1.2 Axiom}

FOL ⊢ ✓

1.1.7. $\forall x,y (\text{part}(x,y) \leftrightarrow \forall z (\text{part}(z,x) \rightarrow \text{part}(z,y)))$
{1.1.2 Axiom,1.11-1.1.1 Axiom,1.12 Axiom,1.13 Axiom}

===== PROOF =====

% ----- Comments from original proof -----
% Proof 1 at 0.01 (+ 0.00) seconds.
% Length of proof is 10.
% Level of proof is 4.
% Maximum clause weight is 0.
% Given clauses 0.

```
1 (all X (prokaryote_1(X) -> original_name_2(X,ladr6) & description_2(X,ladr5) & user_description_2(X,ladr4) & concept2words_2(X,ladr3) & concept2words_2(X,ladr2) & concept2words_2(X,ladr1) & unicellular_organism_1(X) & -eukaryote_1(X) & positively_charged_region_1(fn_prokaryote_1(X)) & chemiosmosis_1(fn_prokaryote_2(X)) & protein_enzyme_1(fn_prokaryote_3(X)) & glycoprotein_1(fn_prokaryote_4(X)) & tangible_entity_1(fn_prokaryote_5(X)) & transmembrane_protein_1(fn_prokaryote_5(X)) & integral_protein_1(fn_prokaryote_5(X)) & transport_protein_1(fn_prokaryote_5(X)) & tangible_entity_1(fn_prokaryote_6(X)) & membrane_protein_1(fn_prokaryote_6(X)) & protein_1(fn_prokaryote_6(X)) & tangible_entity_1(fn_prokaryote_7(X)) & membrane_protein_1(fn_prokaryote_7(X)) & protein_1(fn_prokaryote_7(X)) & spatial_entity_1(fn_prokaryote_7(X)) & polymer_1(fn_prokaryote_7(X)) & ribosome_1(fn_prokaryote_8(X)) & chromosome_1(fn_prokaryote_9(X)) & prokaryotic_chromosome_1(fn_prokaryote_9(X)) & substance_1(fn_prokaryote_10(X)) & cytosol_1(fn_prokaryote_10(X)) & tangible_entity_1(fn_prokaryote_11(X)) & phospholipid_bilayer_1(fn_prokaryote_11(X)) & mixture_1(fn_prokaryote_12(X)) & cytoplasm_1(fn_prokaryote_12(X)) & biomembrane_1(fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & plasma_membrane_1(fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & cell_wall_1(fn_prokaryote_14(X)) & negatively_charged_region_1(fn_prokaryote_15(X)) & surface_1(fn_prokaryote_16(X)) & cytoplasmic_side_1(fn_prokaryote_16(X)) & outside_face_1(fn_prokaryote_17(X)) & extracellular_side_1(fn_prokaryote_17(X)) & nucleoid_1(fn_prokaryote_18(X)) & is_along_2(fn_prokaryote_17(X),fn_prokaryote_1(X)) & is_along_2(fn_prokaryote_16(X),fn_prokaryote_15(X)) & is_along_2(fn_prokaryote_15(X),fn_prokaryote_16(X)) & is_along_2(fn_prokaryote_1(X),fn_prokaryote_17(X)) & has_region_2(X,fn_prokaryote_18(X)) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_3(X)) & site_2(fn_prokaryote_2(X),fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_14(X)) & called_2(fn_prokaryote_6(X),ladr0) & fn_prokaryote_6(X) != fn_prokaryote_5(X) & fn_prokaryote_5(X) != fn_prokaryote_6(X) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_9(X)) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_14(X)) & has_region_2(fn_prokaryote_12(X),fn_prokaryote_15(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_9(X),fn_prokaryote_18(X)) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_12(X)) & is_facing_2(fn_prokaryote_16(X),fn_prokaryote_12(X)) & is_oriented_toward_2(fn_prokaryote_16(X),fn_prokaryote_12(X)) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_8(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_8(X),fn_prokaryote_10(X)) & has_part_2(fn_prokaryote_12(X),fn_prokaryote_10(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_12(X),fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & has_part_2(X,fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & has_part_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_11(X)) & has_region_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_16(X)) & is_outside_2(fn_prokaryote_17(X),fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & has_region_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_17(X)) & has_part_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_6(X)) & has_part_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_4(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_4(X),fn_prokaryote_11(X)) & is_inside_2(fn_prokaryote_5(X),fn_prokaryote_11(X)) & is_across_2(fn_prokaryote_5(X),fn_prokaryote_13(X)) & has_part_2(fn_prokaryote_13(X),fn_prokaryote_5(X))) # label(a620065) # label(axiom) # label(non_clause). [assumption].
2 (exists M (has_part_2(ind_for_prokaryote_0,M) & ribosome_1(M))) # label(non_clause) # label(goal). [goal].
3 prokaryote_1(ind_for_prokaryote_0) # label(a620066) # label(axiom). [assumption].
28 -prokaryote_1(x) | ribosome_1(fn_prokaryote_8(x)) # label(a620065) # label(axiom). [clausify(1)].
63 -prokaryote_1(x) | has_part_2(x,fn_prokaryote_8(x)) # label(a620065) # label(axiom). [clausify(1)].
79 -has_part_2(ind_for_prokaryote_0,x) | -ribosome_1(x). [deny(2)].
83 has_part_2(ind_for_prokaryote_0,fn_prokaryote_8(ind_for_prokaryote_0)). [resolve(3,a,63,a)].
91 ribosome_1(fn_prokaryote_8(ind_for_prokaryote_0)). [resolve(3,a,28,a)].
95 -ribosome_1(fn_prokaryote_8(ind_for_prokaryote_0)). [resolve(83,a,79,a)].
98 $F. [resolve(95,a,91,a)].
```

===== end of proof =====

LRB12: Sentential proof of
Theorem NEAT
(No Event at Two Places)¹

$$\forall m, x, y ((ob(m) \wedge Q(x) \wedge Q(y)) \rightarrow \\ (x \neq y \rightarrow ev(m, x) \neq ev(m, y)))$$

¹Govindarajalulu, Naveen Sundar, Selmer Bringsjord, and Joshua Taylor. "Proof verification and proof discovery for relativity." *Synthese* (2014): 1-18.

Software

- SNARK: resolution theorem prover for FOL with equality.
- SLATE: Graphical, interactive natural deduction prover, built on SNARK.¹

¹ Bringsjord, S., Taylor, J., Shilliday, A, Clark, M. & Arkoudas, K. (2008) "Slate: An Argument-Centered Intelligent Assistant to Human Reasoners" in Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Computational Models of Natural Argument (CMNA 8), Grasso, F., Green, N., Kibble, R. & Reed, C., eds. Pages 1-10, Patras, Greece, July 21, ISBN: 978-960-6843-12-9.

AxPh. $\forall m,x,y ((IOb(m) \wedge Q(x) \wedge Q(y)) \rightarrow (\exists p (Ph(p) \wedge W(m,p,x) \wedge W(m,p,y)) \leftrightarrow (speed(x,y) = cm)))$
{AxPh} Assume ✓

From AxFd. $\forall m,x,y ((IOb(m) \wedge Q(x) \wedge Q(y)) \rightarrow (x \neq y \rightarrow \exists z (Q(z) \wedge (speed(x,z) = cm) \wedge speed(z,y) \neq cm)))$
{From AxFd} Assume ✓

Sort Axiom. $\forall x (Ph(x) \rightarrow B(x))$
{Sort Axiom} Assume ✓

Definition-Event-P. $\forall m,b,p ((IOb(m) \wedge B(b) \wedge Q(p)) \rightarrow (In(b, ev(m,p)) \leftrightarrow W(m,b,p)))$
{Definition-Event-P} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

6. $\forall m,x,y ((IOb(m) \wedge Q(x) \wedge Q(y)) \rightarrow (x \neq y \rightarrow \exists b (B(b) \wedge ((W(m,b,x) \wedge \neg W(m,b,y)) \vee (\neg W(m,b,x) \wedge W(m,b,y))))))$
{AxPh, From AxFd, Sort Axiom}

FOL ⊢ ✓


5. $\forall m,p,q ((IOb(m) \wedge Q(p) \wedge Q(q)) \rightarrow (p \neq q \rightarrow (\exists b (B(b) \wedge ((W(m,b,p) \wedge \neg W(m,b,q)) \vee (\neg W(m,b,p) \wedge W(m,b,q)))) \rightarrow ev(m,p) \neq ev(m,q))))$
{Definition-Event-P}

FOL ⊢ ✓

2. $\forall m,x,y ((IOb(m) \wedge Q(x) \wedge Q(y)) \rightarrow (x \neq y \rightarrow ev(m,x) \neq ev(m,y)))$
{AxPh, Definition-Event-P, From AxFd, Sort Axiom}

Proof Found!

Axioms



Machine 1



Theorem

Axioms



Machine 2



Proof

Theorem

Axioms



Machine 3




Yes/No

Axioms



Machine 1



Theorem

Axioms



Machine 2




Proof

Theorem

Axioms



Machine 3



Yes/No

Denotational Proof Languages

K. Arkoudas. Denotational Proof
Languages. PhD Thesis, MIT, 2000.

Sentence

Proof

\mathcal{L}

\mathcal{K}

Logic

DPL

NDL₀

• Proof of the tautology $A \& B \implies B \& A$:

assume $A \& B$

begin

left-and $A \& B$;

right-and $A \& B$;

both B, A

end

NDL₁

• Proof of the tautology: $(\text{forall } x P(x)) \implies \sim (\text{exists } x \sim P(x))$:

assume $(\text{forall } x P(x))$

suppose-absurd $(\text{exists } x \sim P(x))$

pick-witness w for $(\text{exists } x \sim P(x))$ // we now have $\sim P(w)$

begin

$P(w)$ BY specialize $(\text{forall } x P(x))$ with w ;

absurd $P(w)$, $\sim P(w)$

end.

Diagrammatic Reasoning vs. Spatial Logics

Vivid

Konstantine Arkoudas, Selmer Bringsjord, Vivid: A framework for heterogeneous problem solving, Artificial Intelligence, Volume 173, Issue 15, October 2009.



Attribute Structures and Systems

- Consider an attribute system consisting of two clocks c_1 and c_2 . Then,

$$S = (\{c_1, c_2\}; \text{hours: } \{0, \dots, 23\}, \text{minutes: } \{0, \dots, 59\})$$

- Systems have states σ , and certain states are extensions of others. States may also be disjoint.

Alternative State Extensions



Colour of s	Size of s
{red}	{small, large, medium}
{red, green, blue}	{large, medium}

Specifying a Vivid Language

- Attribute Structure \mathcal{A} .
- First-order vocabulary $\Sigma = (C, R, V)$.
- Interpretation \mathcal{I} of Σ onto \mathcal{A} .

Interpreting First-Order Languages into System States

Attribute Interpretation is a mapping \mathcal{I} that assigns to each relation symbol:

- Realization
- Profile

Running Example: Clock System

• Vocabulary $\Sigma_{\text{clock}} = (C_{\text{clock}}, R_{\text{clock}}, V_{\text{clock}})$

• $C_{\text{clock}} = \{c_1, c_2, c_3\}$, $V_{\text{clock}} = \{x, y, z, x_1, y_1, z_1\}$, $R_{\text{clock}} = \{\text{PM}, \text{AM}, \text{Ahead}, \text{Behind}\}$

• Attribute Structure

$\text{Clock} = (\text{hours: } \{0, \dots, 23\}, \text{minutes: } \{0, \dots, 59\}; \{R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4\})$

• $R_1(h) \leftrightarrow h > 11$, and so on

• Interpretation \mathcal{I}

• Realizations: $\text{PM} \stackrel{\mathcal{I}}{=} R_1$, and so on

• $\text{Prof}(\text{PM}) = [(\text{hours}, 1)]$

Vivid: Syntax

$$\mathcal{D} ::= D \mid \Delta$$

- Logical inference rules: modus ponens, double negation.
- Sentential deduction rules: assume, pick-any, specialize.
- Diagrammatic deduction rules: thinning, cases.

$D ::= \text{RuleApp}$
 $\quad | \text{assume } F \ D$
 $\quad | F \ \text{by } D$
 $\quad | \mathcal{D}; D$
 $\quad | \text{pick-any } x \ D$
 $\quad | \text{pick-witness } w \ \text{for } \exists x . F \ D$
 $\quad | \text{specialize } \forall x_1 \cdots x_n . F \ \text{with } t_1, \dots, t_n$
 $\quad | \text{ex-generalize } \exists x . F \ \text{from } t$
 $\quad | \text{cases by } F_1, \dots, F_k: (\sigma_1; \rho_1) \rightarrow D_1 \mid \cdots \mid (\sigma_n; \rho_n) \rightarrow D_n$
 $\quad | \text{observe } F$

$\Delta ::= \mathcal{D}; \Delta$
 $\quad | \text{claim } (\sigma; \rho)$
 $\quad | (\sigma; \rho) \ \text{by thinning with } F_1, \dots, F_n$
 $\quad | (\sigma; \rho) \ \text{by widening}$
 $\quad | (\sigma; \rho) \ \text{by absurdity}$
 $\quad | \text{cases by } F_1, \dots, F_k: (\sigma_1; \rho_1) \rightarrow \Delta_1 \mid \cdots \mid (\sigma_n; \rho_n) \rightarrow \Delta_n$
 $\quad | \text{cases } F_1 \vee F_2: F_1 \rightarrow \Delta_1 \mid F_2 \rightarrow \Delta_2$
 $\quad | \text{pick-witness } w \ \text{for } \exists x . F \ \Delta$

$\mathcal{D} ::= D \mid \Delta$

Vivid: Evaluation Semantics

$$\gamma \vdash D \leadsto F \text{ and } \gamma \vdash \Delta \leadsto (\sigma; \rho)$$

- In the context γ , deduction $D(\Delta)$ derives F (respectively, $(\sigma; \rho)$)
- Evaluation semantics of Vivid rules

$$\frac{(\beta \cup \{F_1, \dots, F_n\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash (\sigma'; \rho') \text{ by thinning with } F_1, \dots, F_n \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')}{\text{provided } (\sigma; \rho) \Vdash_{\{F_1, \dots, F_n\}} (\sigma'; \rho')} \quad [\text{Thinning}]$$

$$\frac{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash (\sigma'; \rho') \text{ by widening } \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')}{\text{provided } (\sigma; \rho) \sqsubseteq (\sigma'; \rho')} \quad [\text{Widening}]$$

$$\frac{}{(\beta \cup \{\mathbf{false}\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash (\sigma'; \rho') \text{ by absurdity } \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')} \quad [\text{Absurdity}]$$

$$\frac{}{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \mathbf{claim} (\sigma; \rho) \rightsquigarrow (\sigma; \rho)} \quad [\text{Diagram-Reiteration}]$$

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} (\beta \cup \{F_1, \dots, F_k\}; (\sigma_1; \rho_1)) \vdash \Delta_1 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \\ \vdots \\ (\beta \cup \{F_1, \dots, F_k\}; (\sigma_n; \rho_n)) \vdash \Delta_n \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \end{array}}{(\beta \cup \{F_1, \dots, F_k\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \mathbf{cases by } F_1, \dots, F_k: (\sigma_1; \rho_1) \rightarrow \Delta_1 \mid \dots \mid (\sigma_n; \rho_n) \rightarrow \Delta_n \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \text{ provided } (\sigma; \rho) \Vdash_{\{F_1, \dots, F_k\}} \{(\sigma_1; \rho_1), \dots, (\sigma_n; \rho_n)\}} \quad [C_1]}$$

$$\frac{(\beta \cup \{F_1 \vee F_2, F_1\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta_1 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \quad (\beta \cup \{F_1 \vee F_2, F_2\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta_2 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')}{(\beta \cup \{F_1 \vee F_2\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \mathbf{cases } F_1 \vee F_2: F_1 \rightarrow \Delta_1 \mid F_2 \rightarrow \Delta_2 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')} \quad [C_2]$$

$$\frac{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash D \rightsquigarrow F \quad (\beta \cup \{F\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')}{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash D; \Delta \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')} \quad [D; \Delta]$$


$$\frac{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \quad (\beta; (\sigma'; \rho')) \vdash D \rightsquigarrow F}{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta; D \rightsquigarrow F} \quad [\Delta; D]$$

$$\frac{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta_1 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma_1; \rho_1) \quad (\beta; (\sigma_1; \rho_1)) \vdash \Delta_2 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma_2; \rho_2)}{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta_1; \Delta_2 \rightsquigarrow (\sigma_2; \rho_2)} \quad [\Delta; \Delta]$$

$$\frac{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash D_1 \rightsquigarrow F_1 \quad (\beta \cup \{F_1\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash D_2 \rightsquigarrow F_2}{(\beta; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash D_1; D_2 \rightsquigarrow F_2} \quad [D; D]$$

$$\frac{(\beta \cup \{\exists x. F, F[z/x]\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \Delta[z/w] \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho')}{(\beta \cup \{\exists x. F\}; (\sigma; \rho)) \vdash \mathbf{pick-witness } w \text{ for } \exists x. F \quad \Delta \rightsquigarrow (\sigma'; \rho') \text{ provided } z \text{ is fresh}} \quad [EI/\Delta]$$

Running Example: Clock System




Diagrammatic Formal
Verification of Theorem
NEAT

Theorem NEAT/2.2¹

No observer observes the same event at two different space-time locations.

¹Andréka, Hajnal, Judit X. Madarász, and István Németi. "Logic of space-time and relativity theory." Handbook of spatial logics. Springer Netherlands, 2007. 607-711.



m

L_2 : worldline of ph' space

$$ph' \in ev_m(p)$$

$$ph' \notin ev_m(q)$$

\therefore Set of bodies observed by m at p and q are not identical.

Specifying Our Vivid Language

Attribute Structure

$$A = (\{\text{position: } \mathbb{R}^n, \text{slope: } [0,1], \text{line_positions: } \mathbb{R}^{n*}\}; R_1, R_2, R_3)$$

Vocabulary $\Sigma = (C, R, V)$

$$\Sigma = (\{p, q, m, L_1, L_2\}, \{\text{through}(p,L), \text{observes}(p,x), \text{slope_of_one}(L)\}, \emptyset)$$


Interpretation:

Symbol	Arity	Realization	Profile
through	2	R_1	$[(\text{position},1),(\text{line_positions},2)]$
observes	2	R_2	$[(\text{position},1),(\text{position},2)]$
slope_of_one	2	R_3	$[(\text{slope},1)]$


Proof: Δ_0




Proof; Case I: Δ_1




Proof; Case I: Δ_3




Proof, Case II: Δ_2




Proof; Case II: Δ_4



Proof; Case II: Δs





Vivid Proof

from Δ_0 cases by AxFd:


$\Delta_1 \rightarrow \Delta_3$ by claim ph at r

observe observes(ph, r) \wedge through(r, l₁) \wedge
through(p, l₁) \wedge \neg through (q, l₁)

$\Delta_2 \rightarrow \Delta_4$ by D; Δ with AxFd

Δ_5 by claim ph' at r'

observe observes(ph', r') \wedge through(r', l₂)
 \wedge through(p, l₂) \wedge \neg through (q, l₂)



Notation-observes. $\forall m, ph, p (W(m, ph, p) \leftrightarrow \text{observes}(ph, p))$
{Notation-observes} Assume ✓

AxPh. $\forall m, ph (\exists x W(m, ph, x) \wedge \forall p, q (p \neq q \rightarrow ((\text{speed}(p, q) = 1) \leftrightarrow \exists ph (W(m, ph, p) \wedge W(m, ph, q)))))$
{AxPh} Assume ✓

Notation-through, slope_of_one. $\forall p, q ((\text{speed}(p, q) = 1) \leftrightarrow \forall l ((\text{through}(p, l) \wedge \text{through}(q, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l)))$
{Notation-through, slope_of_one} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

1. $\exists x \text{observes}(ph, x) \wedge \forall p, q (p \neq q \rightarrow (\forall l ((\text{through}(p, l) \wedge \text{through}(q, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l)) \leftrightarrow \exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, p) \wedge \text{observes}(ph, q))))$
{AxPh, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

Given. $y \neq c$
{Given} Assume ✓

Given. $c \neq x$
{Given} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

2. $\forall l ((\text{through}(y, l) \wedge \text{through}(c, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l)) \leftrightarrow \exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, y) \wedge \text{observes}(ph, c))$
{AxPh, Given, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

19. $\forall l ((\text{through}(x, l) \wedge \text{through}(c, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l)) \leftrightarrow \exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, x) \wedge \text{observes}(ph, c))$
{AxPh, Given, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

Case II Inference 2. $\text{through}(c, l3) \wedge \neg \text{through}(y, l3)$
{Case II Inference 2} Assume ✓

Case II Inference 3. $\text{through}(c, l4) \wedge \neg \text{through}(y, l4)$
{Case II Inference 3} Assume ✓

From Euclidean Geometry. $\forall p, q (\exists l (\text{through}(p, l) \wedge \text{through}(q, l)) \wedge \neg \exists l2 (l \neq l2 \wedge (\text{through}(p, l2) \wedge \text{through}(q, l2))))$
{From Euclidean Geometry} Assume ✓

Given. $\text{slope_of_one}(l3)$
{Given} Assume ✓

Given. $\text{slope_of_one}(l4)$
{Given} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

13. $\text{through}(c, l3) \wedge (\neg \text{through}(y, l3) \wedge \text{slope_of_one}(l3))$
{Case II Inference 2, Given}

14. $\text{through}(c, l4) \wedge (\neg \text{through}(y, l4) \wedge \text{slope_of_one}(l4))$
{Case II Inference 3, Given}

AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c. $\forall l ((\text{through}(c, l) \wedge \text{slope_of_one}(l)) \leftrightarrow ((l = I3) \vee (l = I4)))$
{AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

15. $\exists l (\text{through}(c, l) \wedge (\text{through}(y, l) \wedge \neg \text{slope_of_one}(l)))$
{AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c, Case II Inference 2, Case II Inference 3, From Euclidean Geometry, Given, Given}

FOL ⊢ ✓

10. $\neg \forall l ((\text{through}(c, l) \wedge \text{through}(y, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l))$
{AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c, Case II Inference 2, Case II Inference 3, From Euclidean Geometry, Given, Given}

FOL ⊢ ✓

Given. $\text{slope_of_one}(l2)$
{Given} Assume ✓

Case II Inference 1. $\text{observes}(ph, x) \wedge (\text{through}(x, l2) \wedge \text{through}(c, l2))$
{Case II Inference 1} Assume ✓

FOL ⊢ ✓

22. $\forall l ((\text{through}(x, l) \wedge \text{through}(c, l)) \rightarrow \text{slope_of_one}(l))$
{Case II Inference 1, From Euclidean Geometry, Given}

FOL ⊢ ✓

8. $\neg \exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, c) \wedge \text{observes}(ph, y))$
{AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c, AxPh, Case II Inference 2, Case II Inference 3, From Euclidean Geometry, Given, Given, Given, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

9. $\exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, x) \wedge \text{observes}(ph, c))$
{AxPh, Case II Inference 1, From Euclidean Geometry, Given, Given, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

FOL ⊢ ✓

Case II Goal. $\exists ph (\text{observes}(ph, x) \wedge \neg \text{observes}(ph, y))$
{AxFd \rightarrow I3 and I4 are the only two lines of slope 1 through c, AxPh, Case II Inference 1, Case II Inference 2, Case II Inference 3, From Euclidean Geometry, Given, Given, Given, Given, Given, Notation-observes, Notation-through, slope_of_one}

Vivid Proof

from Δ_0 cases by AxFd:

$\Delta_1 \rightarrow \Delta_3$ by claim ph at r

observe observes(ph, r) \wedge through(r, l₁) \wedge
through(p, l₁) \wedge \neg through(q, l₁)

$\Delta_2 \rightarrow \Delta_4$ by D; Δ with AxFd

Δ_5 by claim ph' at r'

observe observes(ph', r') \wedge through(r', l₂)
 \wedge through(p, l₂) \wedge \neg through(q, l₂)


verified

Proof that if there is a body b whose wordline for observer m passes through point p but not through q or through q but not through p, then the events observed by m at p and q are different.

There is a point z reachable at the speed of light from p but not from q for observer m.

m observes that there is a body which passes through p but not through q or through q but not through p.

The theorem



Demo!

Further (Special Theory) Proofs

- Time Dilation
- Length Contraction

Objection: How are our
proofs different from
purely sentential ones?

To Do: Proof discovery
with Vivid-Like ω -DPL

Köszönöm szépen